What the code actually does.

A portable pw.receipt.v1 dossier for one unit of accountable work — Ask answers, agent runs, WeaveFS transactions, PR diffs, or imported MCP sessions.

• Actor, goal, CapToken scopes, policy decisions, tool calls, file effects, claims, and evidence refs
• Ed25519 signature over (type, actor, goal, receipt_hash); SHA-256 tamper detection
• CLI: pw receipt ask | agent | weavefs | pr-change | verify | html | redact | slsa | siem-export
• GitHub Action receipt-check blocks invalid receipts at merge time
• VS Code extension lists, verifies, and opens the HTML verifier from receipts/

Reviewers and auditors get a self-contained HTML page. Redacted packs strip prompts and answers while keeping the signature.

• pw receipt html — zero-dependency page, no CDN, works offline
• pw receipt redact — standard (keeps signature) or --strict
• Shows hash, signature, supported vs unsupported claims
• Primary buyer-facing artifact for the AI change-governance wedge

Ask your space with VCIL context envelopes. Answers ship as signed trace v2 bundles with per-claim evidence and Invariant I enforcement.

• Local GGUF when configured; echo fallback otherwise
• Remote OpenAI-compatible / LiteLLM backends; requires llm.remote CapToken and explicit config
• OutputClaim → Transformation → DataVersion provenance paths
• Unsupported assertions flagged in UI and blocked on mirror publish
• Desktop Ask is the full query path; CLI has receipt/policy/identity once traces exist

Register humans, agents, services, and devices with DIDs and CapToken bindings so a receipt can name who acted and under whose authority.

• Registry at $PW_HOME/participants.json; CLI: pw participant add | list | show | remove
• did:key device signing keys for bundles and receipts
• Encrypted keychain (scrypt + AES-256-GCM) when PW_KEYCHAIN_PASSPHRASE is set; pw identity migrate-keychain for existing installs
• P2P node.key still plaintext; restore-from-backup UI deferred
• Capability revocation is local today; cross-peer replication is open work

Import tool sessions from Cursor, Claude, Copilot, or CI into traces and receipts without running agents inside our runtime.

• pw mcp import session.json — file-based import
• pw mcp capture — stdin JSON-RPC stream
• Credential redaction; content stored as sha256 CIDs
• MCP proxy for transparent capture is follow-up work

Local-first workspaces with transactional WeaveFS, authenticated membership, and signed cold-join snapshots.

• CRDT-backed file sync; OPS_FETCH anti-entropy; recovered FileId state
• Authenticated Space ops and snapshot serving; delegated membership chains
• Discovery via mDNS, bootstrap, rendezvous, and relay — DHT listing is out of scope for v0.1
• Desktop live gossip and loopback catch-up are automated; two-device LAN/WAN QA is still a P0 gate
• Content encryption beyond transport is deferred

A three-node fabric: this PC as hub, a Pi 3B on Ethernet, and a Pi 4B on Wi-Fi. Edge agents ingest manticore-net flow metadata into a synced space — not packet payloads.

• libp2p QUIC listen /ip4/0.0.0.0/udp/4001/quic-v1; mDNS on for LAN discovery
• SSH install modeled on manticore-net (explicit host/IP — raspberrypi.local can collide)
• pw daemon start exposes an HTTP gateway at http://127.0.0.1:8788 for the browser client
• pw edge watch --space <path> reads JSONL/SQLite metadata from MANTICORE_HOME / manticore-net-data
• Spaces and agent files sync as soon as a peer connects — no 5s anti-entropy wait on first join

Protocol-boundary plugin: OIDC/DID health, IPFS add/cat, and atomic Evrmore swap offer JSON stored in a space. EVRUS Vault remains the signer. PeerWeave never holds a mnemonic.

• DID / OIDC health against the Vault bridge (typically :8790)
• IPFS via IPFS_API_URL (Kubo HTTP API, typically :5001)
• Swap intents are space files the mesh can sync; Vault signs the chain transaction
• Browser and desktop panels read /v1/evrus on the local gateway
• Full Vault rewrite and on-chain anchoring UX are out of scope for this plugin

Container images for the CLI daemon and the Next.js website. Swarm stack for any Linux host; Render Blueprint for the public browser client.

• docker/compose.yml — hub daemon, website, optional IPFS sidecar
• docker/swarm.yml — replicas 1, linux/amd64 and linux/arm64 placement notes
• Website service name peerweave-web, Node 20, pnpm install && pnpm build, pnpm start
• Browser client still talks to a local/edge gateway — Render does not run libp2p for you

Files, functions, claims, and transformations form a queryable graph with VCIL provenance and PCG multi-axis retrieval.

• Paginated explorer (~50 nodes/page); WebGL 1–2k @ 60fps is deferred
• PCG five-axis fusion and graph-layer forgetting
• GraphQL HTTP API for Ask and explorer queries
• Click-through from a node into the matching space file

Turn a folder into a capability-scoped service port on the peer mesh.

• Local runner with PW_PORT_CAPABILITIES allowlist
• CapToken-gated start / stop / invoke
• Remote advertisements with TTL
• Runtime capability enforcement still incomplete vs the PRD

Selectively publish signed answer bundles and mirror bundles with VCIL validation at publish time.

• Build, redact, publish, and locally anchor
• export_answer_bundle_to_mirror requires a valid Ed25519 signature
• Anchor provider is a local stub; EVRUS chain anchoring stays in the Vault, not this plugin

pw-policy.toml plus CLI and CI checks. Receipt policy is post-hoc today; WeaveFS commit gating is the next P1.

• pw policy init / check — signature required, max unsupported claims, allowed models, denied tools/paths
• GitHub Action enforces hash, signature, and unsupported-claim counts
• Pre-commit policy evaluation on WeaveFS mutations is tracked as peer-weave-policy